Abstract. We describe slightly modified version (that we call the HOT protocol) of the Aiello-Ishai-Reingold oblivious transfer protocol from Eurocrypt 2001. In particular, the HOT protocol will be what we call weakly secure when coupled with many different homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystems. Based on the HOT protocol, we construct an efficient verifiable oblivious transfer protocol and an efficient verifiable private equality test. As a concrete application of our results, we propose a novel protocol called proxy verifiable private equality test, and apply it to a cryptographic auction scheme to improve its security.
Introduction
In a two-party n 1 -oblivious transfer (OT) protocol the chooser receives a chosen single input from the database of n items, without the sender getting to know which element was retrieved. We first present a concise proof that a slightly modified version (that we call the homomorphic oblivious transfer or the HOT protocol) of the n 1 -OT protocol of [AIR01] is perfectly sender-private iff for all possible private keys x of the used homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystem, the corresponding plaintext space is a cyclic group of prime order M . Additionally, we show that the HOT protocol is computationally senderprivate when M is composite but hard to factor by the chooser. This makes it possible to use the recent Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem [DJ03] in this context.
We then also introduce another security notion for oblivious transfer protocols, weak sender-privacy, that is sufficient whenever the oblivious transfer protocol does not have to be chooser-verifiable. Intuitively, a protocol is weakly sender-private if the chooser will never obtain information about more than one item from the database; however, the Chooser can still obtain information about a single item of the database even if his input to the protocol is out of the bounds. We show that the that chooser's input was in the correct range. In this case, some suitable homomorphic cryptosystems are [El 84,Pai99,DJ01,DJ03], and possibly [NS98, OU98] . Therefore, the n 1 -HOT protocol can be based on different hardness assumptions (like the DCRA assumption of Paillier [Pai99] ), made to work efficiently with long strings (in the case of Damgård-Jurik cryptosystems [DJ01, DJ03] ), and efficiently thresholded (in the case of [El 84, DJ03] ).
In a verifiable (also known as "committed"[CvdGT95,CD97,CC00]) oblivious transfer protocol, the chooser obtains sender's commitment to every database element and can later verify if these elements were equal to some other elements, used in other parts of the higher-level protocol. In the new verifiable homomorphic oblivious transfer protocol (Protocol 2), the chooser and the sender execute the HOT protocol so that the chooser obtains the random number that was used by the sender to commit to the chosen database element. Security of the verifiable HOT protocol depends additionally on the security of the employed homomorphic commitment scheme Γ , and on a simple relation between the sizes of plaintext spaces of Π and Γ . In particular, the verifiable HOT protocol based on the ElGamal cryptosystem and on the CGHN commitment scheme [CGHN01] is perfectly sender-private (unlike the recent slightly less efficient verifiable oblivious transfer protocol of [AJL03] that offers only statistical sender-privacy), and allows efficient reconstruction of the transmitted data item (unlike, again, [AJL03] ).
After that, we show how to use the ideas, developed while constructing the HOT and the verifiable HOT protocols, in another context. Private equality test (PET) [FNW96, NP99, BST01] (let the Chooser to know whether the private inputs W Cho and W Sen of the Chooser and the Sender are equal without leaking any other information) is yet another widely used cryptographic protocol. We propose a new two-round homomorphic PET (HPET) protocol that is very similar to the n 1 -HOT protocol. Previously known PET protocols [FNW96, NP99, BST01] were significantly less efficient. The HPET protocol is perfectly sender-private, when based on a homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystem with a prime M like the ElGamal [El 84]. Computational privacy is achieved when the decrypter cannot factor M [DJ03] . As with the HOT protocol, we show how to make the HPET protocol verifiable, although the concrete technique for this will be different.
Finally, we propose a novel application for the new verifiable HPET protocol. Namely, we show that it can be generalised to the proxy verifiable HPET protocol and then use the latter to increase the security of the probably most efficient currently known ((b + 1)st-price sealed-bid) cryptographic auction scheme without threshold trust by Lipmaa, Asokan and Niemi [LAN02] . More precisely, we show how to make the payment enforcement phase of [LAN02] more secure by not revealing the contract price either to the bidders or to the seller, before all the bidders have shown by using the proxy verifiable HPET protocol whether their bid was equal to the (yet unknown to them) value of the highest bid. We hope to see more applications of the proxy verifiable HPET protocol in the future, especially since to the best of our knowledge, no efficient proxy PET protocols were known previously at all.
All the proofs in this paper are slightly simplified due to the lack of space.
Road-map. We start the paper by describing cryptographic building blocks (Section 2). Section 3 defines some properties of the public-key cryptosystems that we need later. Our main contribution starts with Section 4, where we propose the new oblivious transfer protocols and prove their security. In Section 5, we describe a new private equality test protocol, together with some extensions. Finally, in Section 6 we propose some applications of the new protocols.
In particular, we demonstrate how to use the proxy verifiable PET protocol in auctions.
Preliminaries and Cryptographic Building Blocks
Throughout this paper, let k be the security parameter. We assume that the reader knows standard complexity-theoretic notions like negligibility and probabilistic polynomial time (PPT); we take the latter to be equivalent to "efficiently computable". For a positive integer x, let Φ(x) denote the smallest prime divisor of x. Let ϕ(x) be the Euler's totient function of x. Recall that if
For a distribution (random variable) X, let x ← X denote the assignment of x according to X. We often identify sets with the uniform distributions on them, and algorithms with their output distributions, assuming that the algorithm that outputs this distribution is clear from the context or just straightforward to construct. The statistical difference of two distributions X and Y over the discrete support U is defined as ∆ (X||Y ) :
Homomorphic Semantically-Secure Cryptosystems. Let Π = (G Π , E, D) be a public-key cryptosystem, where G Π is the key generation algorithm G Π :
Assume that for every possible private key x, the corresponding message space M Π (x) is an Abelian group with the group operation +, and that the corresponding ciphertext space C Π (x) is a Abelian group with the group operation ·. We denote the space of random coins by R Π (x). (In particular, this notation indicates that M Π (x), R Π (x) and C Π (x) might be unknown to the encrypter, although this is usually not the case.)
We say that Π is homomorphic,
rf e (r, s)) for another deterministic mapping rf e . Given that rf e (r, s + 1) = rf e (r, s) • r, we will denote rf e (r, s) by r s . For an algorithm A, define Adv
to be the advantage that A has over random guessing when trying to distinguish 
Homomorphic commitment schemes. In a commitment scheme Γ = (G Γ , C), the committer sends an element m ← M Γ (x) of the plaintext space to the receiver in a committed form, c ← C K (m; r), where (x, K) is generated by G Γ (1 k ) and r ← R Γ (x). We denote the commitment space of Γ by C Γ (x). In the context of our paper, all commitment schemes are required to be perfectly (or at least statistically) hiding and computationally binding. More precisely, for an algorithm A, define Adv
to be the advantage that A has over random guessing when trying to distinguish random commitments of two elements, chosen by herself. We say that Γ is statistically hiding if for all (not necessarily PPT) algorithms A, Adv hide Γ,k (A) is negligible in k. We allow Γ to be a trapdoor commitment scheme. That is, if A has access to the secret key x, she can break the binding property. Γ is homomorphic if for any (m 1 , m 2 
for some binary operator •. We will sometimes assume that R Γ (x) has a unit element 1.
In the Pedersen commitment scheme [Ped91] , the setting is the same as in the ElGamal public-key cryptosystem, and 1 -oblivious transfer protocol, the chooser receives precisely one, chosen by himself, item from the database µ = (µ 1 , . . . , µ n ) of n items, maintained by the sender. The sender does not get to know which item was transferred. In the general case, the index i in µ i does not have to be an integer (indeed, we will not require it in the following), it is sufficient that different elements of µ are indexed by different elements of some set I = (I 1 , . . . , I n ). However, for the sake of simplicity we will denote the ith element of the database by µ i (and not by µ Ii ).
Importantly, most of the cryptography can be based on the oblivious transfer [Kil88] . Additionally, efficient oblivious transfer is necessary, since oblivious transfer is often the most expensive part of cryptographic protocols. An example is Yao's two-party computation model, where the proxy oblivious transfer [NPS99] is the only sub-protocol that requires public-key operations.
The security of an (information-theoretically sender-private) n 1 -oblivious transfer protocol is usually defined in two parts. We will follow the definitions of [NP01, Section 2.1.1]. (It is possible to switch the security requirements so as to require information-theoretical chooser-privacy and computational senderprivacy, but corresponding protocols will be out of the scope of this paper. See, e.g., [Tze02] Statistical Sender-Privacy: We make the comparison to the ideal implementation, using a trusted third party that receives µ from the sender, receives σ from the chooser, and tells the chooser µ σ . We assume that µ σ is garbage (i.e., a random value from some µ-independent set T ) if σ ∈ I.
We define the security by showing that for every algorithm A, one can define a simulator S that, given only private input σ, random tape r A , and private output µ σ of A, generates output that is statistically indistinguishable from the view of A that reacts with the honest sender Sen. More precisely, for a sender Sen and an algorithm S, define Adv
. We say that the oblivious transfer protocol is statistically sender-private if for every (not necessarily PPT) A there exists a (not necessarily PPT) S, such that Adv otsen Sen,k (A, S) is negligible in k. As usually, sender-privacy is perfect when Adv otsen Sen,k (A, S) = 0. As argued, e.g., in [NP01, Section 2.1.2], an oblivious transfer protocol does not have to guarantee the correctness (even if Cho is honest but Sen is not, Cho will still receive Sen's input µ σ ). Following this convention, also we will leave it up to the application protocols to provide security in this sense. 
. As a consequence, the AIR protocol requires n online encryptions by the sender. A similar but slightly less efficient Often one needs a n 1 -oblivious transfer protocol to be sender-verifiable (also known as "committed") in the next sense [CvdGT95,CD97,AJL03]: after the oblivious transfer protocol, the chooser obtains sender's commitment c i to every database element that can be later used in various zero-knowledge proofs or arguments. Recently, Ambainis, Jakobsson and Lipmaa proposed probably the first two-round verifiable oblivious transfer protocol [AJL03] ; their protocol was based on decoupling the Naor-Pinkas oblivious transfer protocol and the Pedersen commitment scheme. Briefly, the Naor-Pinkas protocol uses a sub-protocol to recover a key that was used to encrypt the database element. The AmbainisJakobsson-Lipmaa (AJL) protocol uses the same sub-protocol to recover a nonce that was used to commit to the database element.
Private Equality Test. At the end of the private equality test (PET, also known as "comparing information without leaking it" or "socialist millionaires's problem") protocol, the Chooser Cho gets to know whether Sender's input W Sen equals to that of the Chooser, W Cho . Cho will not get to know anything else about W Sen , while Sen should not have any private output at all. Exactly as in the case of oblivious transfer, the security is divided into statistical senderprivacy and computational chooser-privacy. The security definitions are standard and we omit them due to the space constraints.
Previously proposed PET protocols [FNW96, NP99, BST01] had an extra emphasis on developing fair protocols where both the Chooser and the Sender get to know the result of comparison. None of these protocols is however really efficient even when simplified so as not to have the fairness property. For example, the PET protocol from [BST01] requires multiple rounds and zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. One application, considered at the end of our paper actually relies on the asymmetric nature of our PET protocols.
recall that a finite cyclic Abelian group is isomorphic to some residue class group Z N . Now, let D and D = 0 be two distributions of elements of Z. We say that D affinely ε-approximates D on additive group G if for every g, g ∈ G, g = 0, ∆ (D · g + g ||D) ≤ ε. We call G ε-affine if such distributions D and D exist. We say that G is computationally ε-affine if it is ε-affine under the condition that g and g must be generated by a PPT algorithm. We say that G is (computationally) non-affine if it is not (computationally) 1/2-affine.
Assume that the order of G is public. First, if G is a cyclic group of prime order, one can define D := |G| and D := G. Then G is 0-affine. If G is a cyclic group of composite order, G ∼ = Z M , then for any generator g of G, all elements ag for gcd(a, |G|) = 1 are generators, while for a with gcd(a, |G|) = 1, | ag | ≤ |G|/2. Therefore, G is non-affine. On the other hand, if one assumes that it is hard to factor |G| then G will be computationally 0-affine. If G is an acyclic group, then every element g ∈ G generates a nontrivial subgroup g of G of order ≤ G/2. In this case, any choice of D = 0 leads to non-affinity even in the computational sense.
Let ε = (ε k ) be a family of probabilities. We say that
is a homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystem, S and T are PPT algorithms, with S(
is a cyclic group with known prime order. We say that Π is computationally affine if for every x, M Π (x) is a cyclic group with known composite order under the assumption that it is hard even for the decrypter to factor M . (If M is not known, perfect affinity may change to statistical affinity.)
Homomorphic Oblivious Transfer Protocols
Simplified notation. To simplify the notation, from now on we will omit the arguments (1 k , K) of S and T , the argument x of M Π and R Π , and the argument x of M Γ and R Γ .
Simpler Protocol without Sender-Verifiability
Protocol 1 depicts the new homomorphic oblivious transfer protocol. A very similar protocol was proposed in [AIR01]; we will provide comparisons later in this section. (c 1 , . . . , c n ) , where c i is computed as follows:
is analogous), the output distribution of the simulator (for fixed random tape ρ of S, and for fixed c) is (ρ; c; . . . , E K (T ; R Π ), . . . ; µ σ ), while the output distribution of A is (ρ; c; .
For a fixed c, the difference between these two distributions is Adv Weak Server-Privacy. Only a few homomorphic semantically secure publickey cryptosystems are affine, as seen from Table 1 . Fortunately, it comes out that the HOT protocol is sender-private under much broader settings when we slightly weaken the security definitions.
We say that the oblivious transfer protocol provides weak sender-privacy if the chooser will retrieve more than an ideal amount of information about at most one value µ i , where i = σ when the Chooser has private input σ ∈ I. Weak sender-privacy is sufficient in almost all cases when the oblivious transfer protocol is not required to be chooser-verifiable. (Chooser-verifiability can be defined as the requirement that the chooser must be able to prove that the database element she received was indexed by her choice.) An example application where weak sender-privacy is sufficient is the paid database queries setting, where the database maintainer is only interested in the number of the items that the client will obtain, and not that the indices of the obtained items satisfy any requirements.
Often (as in the case of the oblivious transfer protocol, proposed in Sect. 4), a weakly sender-private oblivious transfer protocol can be transfered to a statistically sender-private one by accompanying it with a suitable zero-knowledge proof (or argument) that σ ∈ I. Importantly, as we will see from the next theorem, there exist settings where the new oblivious transfer protocol is weakly sender-private but not statistically sender-private. 
random encryptions that are distributed as E K (T ; R Π ), and one encryption of a value E K (µ i + S(σ − i)g; R Π ), this is since Φ(M ) ≥ n.
From the latter she might be able to derive some information about µ i but this is allowed by the security definition.
The second claim of the theorem (about the zero-knowledge argument) is straightforward. Moreover, if I i is encoded as g i for some group element g ∈ M Π then one can show efficiently that j ∈ I by using protocols from [DJ01,LAN02]; for I i = i the corresponding proofs can be found from [Bou00, Lip03] . (See [Lip03] for some other possible encodings.)
Comparison with [AIR01] . The HOT protocol is a generalisation of the protocol of Aiello, Ishai and Reingold [AIR01, Section 5] to a wider selection of plaintext spaces. (Namely, [AIR01] considered only the case when M is a prime.) Careful specification of parameters and the definition of affine cryptosystems allowed us to prove that the protocol is "almost" as secure in cases, not considered in [AIR01] . In particular, as argued earlier, weak sender-privacy is sufficient always when one does not require chooser-verifiability. In most of the real-life scenarios, one does not require chooser-verifiability; in almost all such cases, one can use weakly sender-private variants of the HOT protocol that were not considered in [AIR01] . However, when chooser-verifiability is needed, one will also usually need sender-verifiability, a property not provided by HOT protocol and thus also not by the AIR protocol from [AIR01] . (See Section 4.2 for a new sender-verifiable oblivious transfer protocol.) Discussion. Importantly, one has quite a flexible choice between possible underlying homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystem Π when one only goes for the weak sender-security. Table 1 shows that the HOT is weakly sender-private based on most of the widely known homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystems, and statistically sender-private when based on two known homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystems. From the mentioned homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystems, [NS98] offers a flexible choice of the value Φ(M ) in the range [3, 2 11 ], and for other public-key cryptosystems, Φ(M ) is anyways required to be large for the public-key cryptosystem to be semantically secure. (However, it is not known whether the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem is semantically secure if M is known to Sen.) The Okamoto-Uchiyama public-key cryptosystem [OU98] is a notable exception since there M is not public, and Φ(M ) is not required to be large. Still, even in this case one gets statistical weak sender-privacy by choosing S = Z 2 k+ /2 , where is the key length.
If combined with the Damgård-Jurik cryptosystem from [DJ03] , it becomes possible to use extremely large message spaces. If combined with the ElGamal cryptosystem, one can easily distribute the role of the sender. From the strictly efficiency point of view, the best underlying homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystem would be the ElGamal based on (say) elliptic curves and I i is defined as g i for some generator g.
Verifiable HOT Protocol
Protocol 1 by itself is not (sender-)verifiable but it can be made verifiable by borrowing some ideas from the recent AJL verifiable oblivious transfer protocol by Ambainis, Jakobsson and Lipmaa [AJL03] . More precise, we use the HOT protocol so that the chooser obtains a random nonce m σ that is used also when the sender commits to µ σ . The chooser will thus only be able to recover the value of µ σ . On the other hand, for every i, the sender commits to µ i , using a
Protocol 2 The verifiable HOT protocol
Private inputs: Cho has σ, Sen has µ. Private outputs: Cho obtains µσ. random value tr(m i ) that is known to her. This means that she can use standard zero-knowledge techniques to prove properties of µ i even for i = σ. (v 1 , c 1 , . . . , v n , c n ) , where (v i , c i ) is computed as follows:
Theorem 3. Let k be the security parameter. Assume that Π = (G Π , E, D; S, T ) is an ε-affine homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystem and that Γ is a homomorphic perfectly hiding commitment scheme. For fixed
Then the advantage of A is
The claim follows. Straightforwardly, for the weak sender-privacy it suffices to replace the requirement that Adv
Comparison with previous work. Recall that the up to now most efficient (and the only two-round) verifiable oblivious transfer protocol by AmbainisJakobsson-Lipmaa protocol [AJL03] was statistically private, and at the end of the AJL protocol, the chooser had to compute discrete logarithm to recover the value of µ σ . The verifiable HOT protocol from Protocol 2 solves either-but not both-of these problems, when based on suitable Π and Γ . See Table 2 for a comparison of the verifiable HOT protocol (with the ElGamal cryptosystem but different Γ ) with some previous work. When Γ is the Pedersen commitment scheme with x =x and K =K, and I i = g i for some generator g, the resulting scheme will be somewhat similar to [AJL03] 
tr is the identity function, S = T = Z q , and the resulting protocol will be both computationally chooser-private and perfectly sender-private under the DDH assumption. (Recall that the AJL protocol from [AJL03] was only statistically sender-private.) Similarly to [AJL03] , the drawback of this protocol is that the chooser obtains CK(µ σ ; 0) = g µσ , from which he has to recover µ σ by computing a discrete logarithm.
The 
Private Equality Test and Enhancements
The Homomorphic Private Equality Test Protocol. Assume that a possible wealths W is encoded as W g for a generator g of the cyclic group M Π . (Other encodings might also work) The new homomorphic private equality test (HPET) protocol (Protocol 3) is in a sense just a-although not a straightforwardsimplification of the HOT protocol. Namely, it corresponds to the conditional disclosure of a single element µ W Sen = 0, where instead of i = W Sen , the sender uses i = W Cho . Thus, µ W Sen = 0 will be revealed only when W Sen = W Cho ; otherwise the chooser will obtain a random element of M Π . Therefore, unsurprisingly, the PET protocol is sender-private exactly when based on a Π that also makes the HOT protocol sender-private. 
Theorem 4. Let k be the security parameter. Assume that Π = (G Π , E, D; S, T ) is an ε-affine homomorphic semantically secure public-key cryptosystem, such that it is computationally hard for the decrypter to factor
The HPET protocol is severely more efficient than the BST (BoudotSchoenmakers-Traoré) protocol [BST01] or the protocol from [NP99] . However, the later can be modified (with significant cost in efficiency) so as to provide fairness, i.e., to guarantee that the Sender will only get to know whether W Sen = W Cho if also the Chooser will get to know that. It is unclear yet if our protocol can be modified to become fair, but this is also not our intention.
Unfortunately, the number of currently known homomorphic cryptosystems where the decryption can be performed without knowing the factorisation of This protocol is basically a modification of the HPET protocol with a proxy Peggy who transmits Alice's and B i 's messages to their partners. As a drawback, Protocol 4 reveals W A to Peggy on step 5, but importantly, this only happens after Peggy has committed to B i -s' answers: if Peggy would get to know x before forwarding (K,K, c) on step 2, she might be able, in collaboration with some B i , to stop the protocol before sending the commitment χ to Alice if the outcome is not suitable for Peggy. This attack is relevant in, e.g., the auction scenario (see Sect. 6), and is one of the reasons why x is sent to Peggy only at the end of the protocol. As we will also see in Sect. 6, in some applications revealing W A at the end of the protocol is actually desirable.
Second, more secure, proxy verifiable HPET protocol. (Sketch.) In an alternative protocol to Protocol 4, instead of sending x to Peggy, Alice receives (v, c) from Peggy, obtains all messagesm i , and then proves in zero-knowledge whether v i commits to W A for all i ∈ [1, n] . This protocol is obviously more secure than the first protocol (since x and thus also W A will not be revealed to Peggy), but requires at least one additional round and more communication.
Applications
Applications of the verifiable oblivious transfer protocol. In [AJL03], Ambainis, Jakobsson and Lipmaa proposed several protocols for the cryptographic randomised response technique. Their first protocol-that bases on their own verifiable oblivious transfer protocol-can be made more efficient (and also perfectly private for the respondent) by using the verifiable HOT protocol instead. Note that at least in their application a weakly sender-private oblivious transfer protocol with a trapdoor commitment scheme will be sufficient. See, e.g., [CvdGT95,CD97,CC00] for more applications for the verifiable HOT protocol.
Auctions. The LAN auction scheme [LAN02] is (probably) the most efficient secure cryptographic (b + 1)st auction scheme without threshold trust; in largescale auctions with many participants it requires 10-100 times less communication than the Naor-Pinkas-Sumner scheme [NPS99] . On the other hand, the LAN scheme has two principal drawbacks. First, the involved trusted auction authority A will get to know the bid statistics. As argued in [LAN02] , this is not a weakness from the economic viewpoint when relying on the assumption that the occasional seller and the well-established business authority A do not collaborate.
Second, the LAN scheme has only an optimistic payment enforcement procedure. Namely, after the seller has received the value of the bth highest bid X b from A, reliable winner determination is only possible when all the bidders (or at least b highest bidders) will complete a zero-knowledge proof that shows whether they bid more than X b or not. Clearly, it may be difficult to force the bidders to collaborate at this time-especially after they know the value of X b -, and it may be hard to distinguish between the malicious bidders (who want to disrupt the auctions, lose their interest in participation since they are not winning, or are not willing to pay as much), shills and bidders that have some genuine problems with their software or hardware. Moreover, some bidders might object to such enforcement even if they have no desire to cheat, by whatever moral or psychological reasons.
By using the proxy verifiable HPET protocol (Protocol 4), one can eliminate the second problem of the LAN scheme for b ≤ 1 with a moderate increase in the communication complexity. The basic idea of our solution is that after the third party A has computed the bth highest bid X b , he will not send X b to the seller P , as it was done in the original protocol of [LAN02] . Instead, the seller will act as a proxy in (b − 1) parallel proxy verifiable HPET protocols with the inputs X 1 , . . . , X b−1 from A and the input b i (B i 's bid) from the bidder B i . After the 3rd step of the proxy verifiable PET protocol, neither the seller nor any of the bidders knows X j for any j. Thus, none of the bidders (including the shills who cooperate with the auctioneer) has the motivation to discontinue participation in the auction. In particular, the seller has no better strategy than to be honest in step 4 of Protocol 4. Moreover, he will receive X 1 , . . . , X b−1 only on step 5 of the proxy verifiable HPET protocol, after his commitment and thus his actions are accountable. The drawback of this solution is that the seller will get to know X 1 , . . . , X b−1 .
Alternatively, the participants can use the alternative proxy verifiable HPET protocol that was sketched before; in this case, no X j will be leaked to the seller, but the communication complexity of the whole scheme increases somewhat, since the authority must provide b − 1 zero-knowledge arguments of plaintext equality. One can most probably apply the proxy verifiable HPET protocol also to other protocols in an analogous manner.
